In a business setting, AI systems and personal data are hard to keep apart. As soon as staff ask questions that contain names, or load documents with customer or HR data, the AI is processing personal data. For data protection officers and IT leads, that raises a practical question: where exactly does this data sit, and how do you handle access requests, erasure and permissions there?
This article shows the typical storage places in an AI system that answers from your own documents (RAG), translates the relevant GDPR articles into technical tasks and explains why embeddings are usually not anonymous. It is not legal advice; the assessment always depends on the individual case.
- Personal data can sit in seven places in an AI system: inputs, documents, text chunks with embeddings, chat history, logs, backups and, only after fine-tuning, the model weights.
- According to the German data protection conference (DSK), access, rectification and erasure can usually be handled for inputs, outputs, documents and the vector database. In the language model itself, the DSK calls this largely unsolved.
- Embeddings are not anonymisation: under lab conditions, researchers recovered most texts and names from embeddings. Treat the vector index like the documents themselves.
Where personal data sits in an AI system
An AI system that answers from your own documents is made of several building blocks. The DSK, the joint body of Germany's data protection supervisory authorities, describes the typical set-up in its October 2025 guidance on RAG systems: documents are split into short text sections, called chunks. An embedding model turns each chunk into a vector of numbers, and both are stored together in a vector database. When a question comes in, the system looks up the matching sections and passes them to the language model.
For data protection, this means personal data does not sit in one place but in several.
Two places are often overlooked. First, logs: many systems write questions and answers to log files for troubleshooting and often keep them there longer than the chat history itself. Second, backups: a deleted document can still exist in backups weeks later. Both belong in your record of processing activities and in your deletion policy.
Model weights are a special case. As long as you only use a language model, do not train it further on your own data and no external provider uses your inputs for training, your documents do not end up in the model. If you fine-tune on personal data, however, you may write it into the model, where it can hardly be removed selectively. More on this in the article Train AI on your own data. What the DSK asks for overall is summarised in the guide to the DSK AI guidance.
What GDPR rights mean inside an AI system
The GDPR has no special rules for AI. The familiar rights and duties apply, and you need to be able to honour them in every store. In its RAG guidance, the DSK states that data subjects hold their rights under Articles 15 et seq. GDPR for inputs and outputs, the reference documents and the vector database, and that transparency, access, rectification and erasure can usually be implemented there (section 3.7). The full checklist is in the guide GDPR-compliant AI.
| Provision | What it requires | What it means in the AI system |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 15 access | information and a copy of the data | find the person in documents, chunks, history and logs |
| Art. 16 rectification | correct inaccurate data | correct the source document, re-import it, replace old chunks |
| Art. 17 erasure | erase without undue delay where a ground applies | delete document, chunks, embeddings, history and logs; backups via rotation |
| Art. 5(1)(e) storage limitation | keep data only as long as necessary | retention periods for history, logs, backups and index |
| Art. 25 data protection by design and by default | privacy-friendly defaults | short retention and lean logs by default |
| Art. 32 security | appropriate technical and organisational measures | access concept, encryption, ability to restore |
Your reply to the data subject is governed by Article 12(3) GDPR: without undue delay and at the latest within one month. For complex or numerous requests, the deadline can be extended by two further months; you must tell the person within the first month and give the reasons. So decide in advance how you will search every store for one person. A full-text search across documents, history and logs is usually the direct route; the vectors alone are less suitable because they capture meaning rather than exact names.
The language model is a different matter. The DSK calls the implementation of data subject rights in AI models, especially large language models, "largely unsolved". Regulators do not agree on how to classify the models themselves either. In a July 2024 discussion paper, which it called a prompt for debate and which preceded the EDPB opinion, the Hamburg data protection commissioner put forward the thesis that the language model itself does not store personal data, and that data subject rights apply at least to input and output. The paper concerns only the model, not the vector index or documents of a RAG system. In December 2024, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) stated that AI models trained on personal data cannot, in all cases, be considered anonymous (Opinion 28/2024, para. 34).
Pseudonymous, anonymous, embedded: where the line is
Two terms are often confused. Pseudonymised data can no longer be attributed to a person without additional information, but can be with it (Article 4(5) GDPR). For you as the controller, who can re-link the data, it remains personal data. Information is only anonymous once the person can no longer be identified by the means reasonably likely to be used (Recital 26). Only then does the GDPR not apply.
At first sight, embeddings look anonymous: a sentence becomes a list of hundreds to thousands of numbers. Research shows, however, that the text can often be recovered from them. Morris and colleagues at Cornell University used their Vec2Text method to reconstruct 92% of 32-token text inputs exactly from their embeddings. From embedded clinical notes, they recovered 89% of full names. As early as 2020, Song and Raghunathan recovered 50 to 70% of the words from popular sentence embeddings.
These results were obtained under lab conditions: the attackers had access to the vectors and could query the embedding model as often as they liked. On top of that, many vector databases store the text chunk itself next to each vector, as the DSK also describes. Writing about AI models, the EDPB also stresses that information can relate to a person even when it is only encoded in a machine-readable form (Opinion 28/2024, para. 37); the same logic applies to embeddings.
In practice, this means treating the vector index with the same level of protection as the documents it was built from. It needs a legal basis (DSK, section 3.6), an access concept and a deletion policy. Data minimisation still pays off: according to the DSK, personal data is to be removed or anonymised during data preparation where it is not needed (section 3.1). Where it is needed, pseudonymisation lowers the risk; Article 32 GDPR names it explicitly as a security measure.
Erasure that reaches every store
An erasure request under Article 17 GDPR is only fully implemented once the data has been removed from every active store and a documented approach covers the backups. In a RAG system this is quite feasible: according to the DSK, entries in the vector database are "directly addressable, so personal data can be deleted selectively" (section 3.5). For this to work reliably, the erasure has to carry through, from the source document to the backup.
With connected sources, the sync is what matters: when a document is deleted in the source system, the next synchronisation has to remove it from the index as well. Check this with a test document before you go live, and record the result.
The GDPR does not regulate backups explicitly. In practice, individual records are rarely deleted from backups. A common approach is to overwrite backups on a fixed rotation, protect them against access and make sure that deleted data does not reappear after a restore, for example by re-applying deletions afterwards. Write this approach into your deletion policy. Statutory retention duties can stand in the way of erasure (Article 17(3)(b) GDPR); in that case, restrict processing to the retention purpose and take the data out of AI use.
Erasure in the model is much harder. The DSK writes that, despite the advantages of a RAG system, "the problems of deleting data in the language model remain" (section 3.5). In its June 2025 guidance on technical and organisational measures, it states that filters are to be used as an interim solution but do not "in themselves" amount to erasure (p. 23).
Access, retention and lean logging
Who may find which content through the AI is not decided in the language model. The DSK points out that the language model itself cannot control who may access what. In the RAG part, by contrast, proven measures apply, such as tenant separation and a rights and roles concept for areas of the vector database and the reference documents (section 3.3). In practice: separate content by purpose, for example HR documents in their own project with a small group of users and manuals in an open one.
Also check whether permissions are carried over from the source system. Not every system takes over the permissions of individual documents from drives, wikis and ticket systems. If it does not, only put content in a shared project that every member may see. The DSK asks you to check, for each new data source of a RAG system, whether everyone with access may also access the new data (guidance on technical and organisational measures, p. 24).
Storage limitation (Article 5(1)(e) GDPR) and privacy-friendly defaults (Article 25(2) GDPR) favour short retention. As an example for employee accounts, the DSK mentions not using inputs for training and not keeping an input history beyond the session (guidance on AI and data protection, May 2024, margin no. 43). Whether your use case also needs a data protection impact assessment is best settled early.
For logs, a simple rule helps. Logs are useful for security (Article 32 GDPR) and troubleshooting, but not necessarily with the wording of every question. Log metadata such as time, user, project and source, and store content only where there is a purpose for it, with its own short retention period.
All points ticked. Well prepared.
Personal data in RAGSuite
RAGSuite is a RAG engine: RAGSuite does not train a model on your data. Documents, text chunks and embeddings live in the search index, where you manage and delete them. The free Community Edition (Apache-2.0) offers automatic deletion with deletion receipts, two-factor sign-in, an audit log of the last 15 days and a basic query history. It runs on your own server, offline too, and sends no telemetry.
For organisations with several teams, Enterprise adds roles and project access, single sign-on, the full audit history with export, and retention policies with legal hold. Important for your access concept: RAGSuite does not take over the permissions of individual documents from source systems; you separate content through projects, and in Enterprise you control which teams can access which project. The page AI data protection shows the data protection features, and the guide RAG pipeline explains how data flows through the system.
Check your AI system with Stefan: where data sits, how erasure carries through and how to separate access. Free for 7 days with the RAGSuite Engine Starter plan, or in a call.
Frequently asked questions
Are embeddings personal data?
Usually yes, if the underlying text chunks contain personal data. Studies show that, under lab conditions, most texts and names can be recovered from embeddings, and the text is often stored next to the vector anyway. So treat the vector index like the documents themselves.
How do you delete personal data from an AI system?
In a RAG system, you delete the source document, its chunks and embeddings in the index, and the affected chat histories and log entries. Backups drop out with rotation. From a fine-tuned model, by contrast, data can hardly be removed selectively; according to the DSK, filters do not count as erasure.
Does the right of access cover AI chats?
Yes. According to the DSK, data subjects hold their rights under Articles 15 et seq. GDPR for inputs and outputs, reference documents and the vector database, insofar as personal data is processed there. The reply is due without undue delay and at the latest within one month.
Is pseudonymisation enough to take data outside the GDPR?
No. For you as the controller, pseudonymised data remains personal data (Recital 26 GDPR). According to the CJEU (C-413/23 P, 2025), it can only be different for a recipient who cannot re-identify the people. Pseudonymisation does lower the risk and is a security measure named in Article 32. Data is only anonymous once the person can no longer be identified by means reasonably likely to be used.
Does RAGSuite write your data into the language model?
No. RAGSuite does not train a model on your data. Documents, text chunks and embeddings live in the search index, where you can delete them. Whether a pretrained model itself contains personal data is a separate question (see chapter 2). If you use an external language model, its contract governs what happens to the question and the passages.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), EUR-Lex: Articles 4(5), 5, 12, 15 to 17, 25, 32 and Recital 26
- DSK: Guidance on data protection specifics of generative AI systems using the RAG method (October 2025, German): sections 2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.5 to 3.7
- DSK: Guidance on recommended technical and organisational measures for developing and operating AI systems (June 2025, German): pp. 23 and 24
- DSK: Guidance on artificial intelligence and data protection (6 May 2024, German): margin no. 43
- EDPB: Opinion 28/2024 on AI models (17 December 2024): paras 34 and 37
- Hamburg DPA (HmbBfDI): discussion paper “Large Language Models und personenbezogene Daten” (July 2024, German): theses 1 and 2
- Morris et al. (2023): Text Embeddings Reveal (Almost) As Much As Text, EMNLP 2023: abstract and section 5.3
- Song and Raghunathan (2020): Information Leakage in Embedding Models, ACM CCS 2020: abstract
Stefan works with customers in public administration and regulated industries. He writes about the GDPR, the EU AI Act, works councils and tenders.